Filed under: Middle East
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28 July 2009
Whenever the possibility of establishing an independent Palestinian state is mentioned by Israeli politicians, they take for granted that their interlocutors understand that the future state would have to be demilitarized and disarmed, if an Israeli consent for its existence is to be gained. Recently, this precondition was mentioned by the current Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in response to President Barrack Obama’s two states vision, presented to the world at large in his Cairo Speech this June. Netanyahu made this precondition first and foremost for domestic consumption: whoever has referred in the past to the creation of an independent state alongside Israel, and whoever does so today in Israel envisages a fully armed Israel next to a totally disarmed Palestine. But there was another reason why Netanyahu stressed the demilitarization of Palestine as a sine qua non: he knew perfectly well that there was no danger that even the most moderate Palestinian leader would accept such a caveat from the strongest military power in the Middle East.
In Israel, as in the West, the vision of a demilitarized Palestine is accepted as a feasible scenario, whereas a peace based on the demilitarization of Israel as well would be regarded as totally insane and unhelpful, indeed unimaginable. This disparity in the attributes of statehood is part of a much larger imbalance in the international community perception of and attitude towards Israel and Palestine.
Most Israelis would deem it sheer lunacy to contemplate a future without the army playing a dominant and supreme role in their lives. It is with good reason that scholars regard Israel not as a state with an army, but an army with a state. Their state appears in the works of some brave critical Israeli sociologists as a prime case study for a modern day militarized society; namely one in which the army deeply affects every sphere of life.
[i] Imagining an Israel without this influence is more than a utopian vision, it is really an end of time scenario.
And yet in the long run demilitarizing both Israel and Palestine may be the only way of ensuring a normal life for all who live there, and all who ought to live there, like the million Palestinian refugees who were expelled from their homeland in 1948 and ever since. But this article aims to extend the meaning of the verb Disarm, to a wider, and admittedly more fluid interpretation. The more extended definition, it will be argued here, turns the idea of Disarming Israel from a utopian scenario for a very distant future, when the peace of the prophets would prevail, into a concrete political plan.
Long before one can contemplate any significant reduction of arms, let alone disarmament of anyone involved in the Palestine issue, a very different kind of disarmament is required, as a pre condition for reconciliation in Israel and Palestine. The wider context of disarmament must focus on Israel and less on Palestine, at least in its initial stages. There are no other current political, economic and military imbalances such as exist between Israel and the few hundred Palestinian fighters (even the term fighters for these Palestinians begs some stretching of our imagination). As these imbalances were there already in 1948, it stands to reason that only a transformative process in the attitude and nature of the stronger party in the equation will kick off any significant reconciliation on the ground. Throughout the one hundred years or so of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Zionist movement and later the state of Israel were the stronger party, and its policies towards the indigenous population of Palestine changed very little over that period.
This article is written under the premise that only a fundamental change in the basic Israeli policies towards the Palestinians and Palestine can lead to a change of attitude towards the Jewish settler community that came to Palestine in the late 19th century and colonized the land. Contrary to the conventional Israeli and Zionist narrative, still trumpeted proudly in the West today, the harsh anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian policies of the Jewish state are not a reaction to Palestinian hostility or general Arab animosity. These policies are in fact the cause of the regional antagonism towards Israel and Palestinian enmity towards it. Hence, since they are the source of the conflict and the reason for its persistence, disarming here is a quest for a way of exposing what lies behind the Israeli policies against the Palestinians. Since these policies have by now triggered the introduction of nuclear weapons to the region, the death of tens of thousands of Palestinians, thousands of people in the neighbouring Arab countries, almost twenty thousand Jews in Israel, inflamed a new wave of anti-Semitism as well as Islamophobia and finally strained unnecessarily the relationship of the West with the Muslim world, they are obviously a deadly weapon and must be revised.
These policies are the product of a certain ideology, Zionism, or to be more precise of a certain interpretation of the Zionist ideology. Hence revising them would mean disarming Israeli Jews of the lethal version of the Zionist ideology, that which disables them to lead normal, quiet and secure lives in the country they have chosen at the end of the nineteenth century as their homeland.
The Production of the Weapon
The Zionist movement appeared in central and east Europe in the late nineteenth century as a movement motivated by two noble impulses. The first was a search by the Jewish leadership for a safe haven for its community that was increasingly exposed to a hostile anti-Semitic environment with the potential, which was realized in WWII, to become genocidal. The second impulse was a wish to redefine Judaism in a new secular form, inspired by the surrounding spring of nations when so many cultural, religious and ethnic groups redefined themselves in the new intoxicating terms of nationalism. As mentioned, the search for security and new self determination was noble and normal at the time. However, the moment these impulses were territorialized, namely gravitated towards a specific piece of land, the national project of Zionism became a colonialist one. This was also normal at the time, when Europeans, for a plethora of reasons migrated to non-European lands, colonized for them by force of expulsion and genocide by their greedy governments. But noble it was not. Where genocide occurred alas there was no way back, but where colonization did not deteriorate to such criminality, which was the norm, the settlers eventually returned to their countries of origin and the colonized became independent. The territory coveted by the Zionist movement, after other territorial options were examined, was Palestine where for hundreds of years the Palestinian people had lived.
The first Zionist settlers of Palestine arrived in the 1880s without declaring openly their dream of taking over the land and without disclosing their desire to cleanse it of its indigenous population. Until the 1930s, the leadership of the settler community was preoccupied with winning international support and legitimacy – which the British Empire gave them with the Balfour Declaration in November 1917 – and with gaining a foothold as a state within a state, which the British mandatory government allowed them to do. In that period their main predicament was that world Jewry did not fancy Palestine either as their salvation or destination. It was only with the rise of Nazism and Fascism in Europe that the validity of Palestine as a safe haven for the Jewish people made sense and the community of settlers grew in numbers. Still, until the end of the British mandate, it consisted of only one third of the overall population and possessed less than ten percent of the land in Palestine.
It was in the 1930s that the ideological weaponry, soon to be translated into real arms of destruction, was forged. A formula emerged which became consensual and almost sacred to those who led the Zionist movement then and those who lead the state of Israel today. The formula was simple: for the Zionist project in Palestine to succeed, the movement had to take over as much of the land of Palestine as possible and make sure that as few Palestinians as possible remain on it. This was – cynical though it may sound – in order for the new state to be democratic. The hope was to maintain a Jewish majority that would democratically vote for keeping the country Jewish eternally. In the 1930s, an additional recognition emerged: there was no hope that the indigenous people of Palestine would either diminish in numbers, or give up their natural right to live on their land as a free people, either then or in the future. Thus, for the ‘existential’ formula to succeed you needed military power of enforcement. This did not only mean building an army, but granting the military a prominent role, to the point of domination over all other aspects of life in Palestine as a Jewish community. Critical Israeli sociologists traced with astonishment how systematic and ever expanding this process has been ever since the conscious decision to militarize Zionism was made in the 1930s.
[ii] Political leadership, economic directorship even social and cultural management are all won through a military background or a career in the security octopus that runs Israel. Moreover, the major decisions on foreign and defense policy – especially towards the Arab world in general and the Palestinians in particular – were made ever since the 1930s by generals. The end result is only too visible today in Israel: the budget and the economy as a whole, the socialization process and educational system even the media, are all geared to service the army.
An Army with A State
Thus, the process of militarization of Israeli society was intense and exponential. Israel indeed became an army with a state. Two aspects are in particular worth stressing in this context. The first is the militarization of the educational system. Since this part of reality ensures that a militarized perception of life is reproduced time and again with each new generation of young men and women who will only be able to view reality through the perspective of an armed conflict, military values and wars. The second is the prominent economic role the Israeli arms industry plays in the state’s national product and in particular how crucial it is for its trade balance and export. Israel is the fifth largest exporter of arms in the world and hence any anti-militarized discourse, let alone action, can also be easily portrayed as undermining the very survival of the Israeli industry and economy.
This paramount position would not have been won without an occasional proof that the military force was badly needed. There are two types of military action: one a cyclic confrontation with regular Arab armies, not always initiated by Israel (the 1973 war was an Egyptian-Syrian initiative), but all could have been averted had not the Israeli army wished to be engaged in the battlefield for the sake of its own morale, its status and its need to experiment with weapons and exercise its soldiers. More importantly, each war enabled Israel to extend its territory in a never ending quest for living space and margins of security. The last round of this kind of military confrontation was in 1973 and despite Israeli attempts to engage the Syrian army twice since, once in 1982 and then in 2006; Israeli troops did not fight a war against a conventional army in the last thirty five years. Most of its weaponry, the most sophisticated and updated in the world, was produced for huge land and air campaigns between mammoth sized regular armies, but instead it has been used in the last thirty five years mainly against unarmed civilians and guerrilla fighters. The collateral damage is inevitable, as are the doubts about Israeli ability to engage in a genuine conventional war.
The second use of the military power was for implementing the Zionist ideal and the formula mentioned above for upholding it, namely the need to maintain a hold over most of Palestine with as few Palestinians in it as possible, if the Zionist project is to survive.
It began with a carefully planned scheme of ethnically cleansing the country of as many Palestinians as possible in 1948 when the British mandate came to an end. The British government decided in February 1947, after thirty years of rule, to leave the question of Palestine in the hands of the UN with a genuine hope not to be involved any more in a country they developed on the one hand but helped to destroy by their pro-Zionist and anti-Palestinian policy, on the other. After the tribulations of WWII, the demise of British power in the world, a devastating economic crisis and loss of men on the ground, London had had enough.
The Palestinian political elite and the Arab neighbouring countries hoped the UN would deliberate long on what to do with a minority of settlers living amidst an indigenous majority, but they were wrong. The UN was quick to decide on granting more than half of the country to that minority. The world was looking for a quick way out of the Holocaust and forcing the Palestinian to give up half of their homeland seemed a very convenient and reasonable price to pay. No wonder the Palestinian leadership and the Arab League publicly rejected the UN plan. This plan was articulated in a UN General Assembly resolution in November 1947 offering the Palestinians a mere 45% of their home land. The Zionist leadership although unhappy at being granted only 55% of the land, nonetheless realized that the resolution accorded a historical international recognition to their right of dispossessing Palestine. The UN, on top of it, due to the Zionist acceptance and the Palestinian rejection rebuked the Palestinians, praised the Israelis and ignored the fact that on the ground Jewish forces began to forcefully evict the Palestinians from their homeland.
In February 1948, Within a year of the British decision to leave Palestine, the Zionist leadership began ethnically cleansing it. Three months later, when the British left, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were already refugees, pressuring the Arab world to take action, which it did on 15 May 1948. But the limited number of troops it sent to Palestine were no match for the efficient Jewish forces and they were defeated. The ethnic cleansing continued and at the end of it almost a million Palestinians became refugees (half of Palestine’s population) and with them disappeared half of the country’s villages and towns, erased from the face of the earth by the Jewish forces.
The use of force against the Palestinians as means of achieving control over territory and containment of population continued after 1948. It was used in 1956 to massacre Palestinian villagers who were part of the small minority who had survived the 1948 ethnic cleansing and became Israeli citizens. Every now and then, but not too often, that minority would protest against its oppression and would face the powerful fist of the Israeli military and police authorities.
It was then used, and this time frequently, in the areas Israel occupied in June 1967: the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Whenever the Palestinians under occupation protested and struggled against the occupation, the Israeli military responded with all its firepower. Tanks, aircraft, naval destroyers and all the rest of the arsenal used in conventional war theatres against armies of similar might were mercilessly employed against the urban and rural areas of the densely populated West Bank and Gaza Strip, wreaking havoc and destruction of unimaginable proportions. Similarly, in two onslaughts on Lebanon in 1982 and 2006 like force was used to devastate the Lebanese urban and rural spaces.
Three chronological junctures are particularly worth mentioning in this respect in order to illustrate the ferocity of armaments when it is employed in order to implement a century old colonialist ideology. In October 2000, a frustrated Israeli army just forced to withdraw from southern Lebanon by the Hezbollah responded with its entire sophisticated army against a fresh Palestinian attempt to resist the occupation. For the first time F-16s and the mighty Merkava Tanks were used in an urbanicide to subdue the rebellion.
[v] This same military might, but with more collateral damage and the addition of cluster bombs, was used against Lebanon in 2006 after two Israeli soldiers were captured by the Hezbollah. Finally, as is only too familiar by now, the Israeli army experimented with the most lethal state of the art weapons, such as phosphorous bombs and fibber glass shells, in order to quell a rebellious Gaza strip suffering under the yoke of closure and starvation for more than eight years.
If one adds to the deadly arsenal Israel possesses the armament of its Arab neighbours, always engaged in a crazy arms race, first fed by the cold war then by world military industry, it becomes obvious how any step towards disarming people of the ideological urge to use power could contribute to peace and reconciliation. Moreover, one has to consider the nuclear option available to Israel but which has not been used (although there have been reports of employment of tactical nuclear weapons on several occasions). Atom bombs are still considered in Israel a doom’s day weapon to be used only in case of an imminent defeat of the Jewish state. But I feel this is no longer the main scenario among the political and military elite of the state. There it is considered the main factor enhancing the myth of Israeli invincibility. Hence the desperate attempt of Arab regimes such as Syria and Egypt and, elsewhere in the Middle East, Iran, to follow suit; all leading to an ever growing destructive capability that can be realized at any moment.
As suggested, all this armament and its frequent use are mainly, not exclusively, the product of an ideological mind set. The axiom is that colonization of part of the Arab world was an existential inevitability for the Jewish people and that only by building a formidable military force so as to gain full control of the land with as little of its indigenous people as possible, could it be realized. The arms amassed and their frequent employment do not menace only the Palestinians, they prevent the Jews in Israel from leading a normal life and they pose a threat to the stability of the region, and quite probably beyond it. While disarmament, in the literal sense, is perhaps a dream, and quite frankly could turn into a nightmare, if only one side is disarmed, diffusing of the ideology is feasible, reliable and peaceful.
Diffuse and Disarm: Past Attempts and A Future Road Map
In the 1980s, Israeli intellectuals, academics, playwrights, musicians, journalists and educators developed second thoughts about the validity of Zionist ideology, and some no longer take it for granted. Their critique on Zionism varied in its intensity and severity, but, for want of a better term, they were all dubbed post-Zionists not anti-Zionists. All in all, their understanding of Zionism was very different from the way it was interpreted by the vast majority of Jews in Israel: in their depiction Zionism was and remained a settler colonialist movement, informing a militarized society and nearly an apartheid system. This post Zionist critique entered for a while into the public sphere and influenced, albeit in a very limited way, the educational curricula, some of the documentary films on television and the general discourse. This new thinking was there for about a decade, during the 1990s. Then came the second intifada, uprising, and the urge for openness subsided and almost totally disappeared.[vi]
The Jewish society in Israel in the beginning of the 21st century has closed the door it had prised slightly open in the 1990s. Today, it has become even more rigid in its ideological convictions and intransigence. Hence, all the factors mentioned above about militarism and armament are still relevant in this time and age. But it is this exposure of a harsh ideological society that may harbour the seeds for a future change. The logic of the present ideological realities, and their military implications, are that one cannot hope for a change from within in the near future. Without this change, arms production, lethal employment of weapons and their deadly impact will continue unabated. So it is urgent to look for alternative ways of changing a public mind and a political system, with the realization that a change from within is right now impossible.
In the face of more than a century of dispossession and forty years of occupation the Palestinian national movement and activists were looking for the appropriate response to the devastating policies implemented against them. They have tried it all – armed struggle, guerrilla warfare, terrorism and diplomacy: nothing worked. And yet they are not giving up and now they are proposing a nonviolent strategy — that of boycott, sanctions and divestment. By these means they wish to persuade Western governments to save not only them, but ironically also the Jews in Israel from an imminent bloodbath. This strategy bred the call for a cultural boycott of Israel. The demand is voiced by every part of Palestinian existence: by the civil society under occupation and by Palestinians in Israel. It is supported by the Palestinian refugees and is led by members of the Palestinian exilic communities.
BDS has become a valid option because of a fundamental shift in public opinion in the West. And indeed if there is anything new in the never-ending tragedy of Palestine it is the clear shift in public opinion in the West. Britain is a case in point. I remember coming to these isles in 1980 when supporting the Palestinian cause was confined to the left and in it to a very particular section and ideological stream. The post-Holocaust trauma and guilt complex, military and economic interests and the charade of Israel as the only democracy in the Middle East all played a role in providing immunity for the State of Israel. Very few were moved, so it seems, by the dispossession of half of Palestine’s native population, destruction of half of their villages and towns, discrimination against the minority among them who live within Israel’s borders through an apartheid system and the division into enclaves of two and a half million of them in a harsh and oppressive military occupation.
Almost 30 years later it seems that all these filters and cataracts have been removed. The magnitude of the ethnic cleansing of 1948 is well known, the suffering of the people in the occupied territories recorded and described even by the US president as unbearable and inhuman. In a similar way, the destruction and depopulation of the greater Jerusalem area is noted daily and the racist nature of the policies towards the Palestinians in Israel are frequently rebuked and condemned.
The reality today, in 2009, is described by the UN as ‘a humanitarian catastrophe’. The conscious and conscientious sections of British society know full well who caused this catastrophe. It is no longer related to elusive circumstances, or to ‘the conflict’ – it is seen clearly as the outcome of Israeli policies throughout the years. When Archbishop Desmond Tutu was asked for his reaction to what he saw in the occupied territories, he noted sadly that it was worse than apartheid. He should know.
This qualitative change in public opinion and mood is visible in other Western countries; needless to say that in the vast world this has been the case for years now. A similar mood prevailed towards Apartheid in South Africa. The reality there then and the reality in Palestine now prods decent people, either as individuals or as members of organizations, to voice their outrage against the continued oppression, colonization, ethnic cleansing and starvation in Palestine. They are looking for ways of protest and some even hope to convince their governments to change their old policy of indifference and inaction in the face of the continued destruction of Palestine and the Palestinians. Many among them are Jews, though, according to the logic of the Zionist ideology, these atrocities are perpetrated in their name and quite a few among them are veterans of previous civil struggles in this country and for similar causes all over the world. They are not confined any more to one political party and they come from all walks of life.
So far the British government, like other Western governments, is not moved. It was also passive when the anti-apartheid movement in Britain demanded of its government to impose sanctions on South Africa. It took several decades for that activism from below to reach the political top. It takes longer in the case of Palestine: guilt about the Holocaust, distorted historical narratives and contemporary misrepresentation of Israel as a democracy seeking peace and the Palestinians as eternal Islamic terrorists blocked the flow of the popular impulse. But it is beginning to find its way and manifest its presence, despite the continual demonization of Islam and Arabs and notwithstanding the persistent accusation that any criticism of Israel is anti-Semitic. The third sector, that important link between civil society and government agencies, has shown us the way. One trade union after another, one professional group after another, all sent a clear message recently: enough is enough. They do so in the name of decency, human morality and basic civil commitment not to remain idle in the face of atrocities of the kind Israel has and still is committing against the Palestinian people.
The validity of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions option is a first step in triggering a process of disarming Israel from its lethal ideology and its real material arms. Boycotts and external pressure have never been attempted in the case of Israel, a state that wishes to be included in the civilized democratic world. Israel has indeed enjoyed such a status since its creation in 1948 and, therefore, succeeded in fending off the many United Nations’ resolutions that condemned its policies and, moreover, managed to obtain a preferential status in the European Union. Israeli academia’s elevated position in the global scholarly community epitomizes this western support for Israel as ‘the only democracy’ in the Middle East. Shielded by this particular support for academia and other cultural media, the Israeli army and security services can go on, and will go on, demolishing houses, expelling families, abusing citizens and killing children and women almost daily without being called to account, regionally or globally, for their crimes.
Military and financial support is significant in enabling the Jewish state to pursue the policies it does. Any decrease in such aid is most welcome in the struggle for peace and justice in the Middle East. But the cultural image Israel enjoys feeds the political decision in the west to unconditionally support the Israeli destruction of Palestine and the Palestinians. A message that will be directed specifically against those who officially represent Israeli culture (spearheaded by the state’s academic institutes which have been particularly culpable in sustaining the oppression since 1948 and the occupation since 1967), can be the start of a successful campaign for disarming the state from its ideological constraints (as similar acts at the time had activated the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa).
External pressure is effective in the case of a state in which people want to be regarded as part of the civilized world, but whose government, with their explicit or implicit help, pursues policies that violate every human and civil right. Neither the UN nor the US and European governments and societies have sent a message to Israel that these policies are unacceptable and have to be stopped. It is up to the civil societies to send messages to Israeli academics, businessmen, artists, hi-tech industrialists and every other section in society, that there is a price tag attached to such policies.
There are encouraging signs that civil society, and particular professional unions, is willing to intensify its pressure. The achievements are symbolic in legitimizing a demand for disarming the state from its practices and ideological prejudices.
However, pressure is not enough if an effective dismantling of the ideology that produces the weaponry is desired. It should be complemented by a process of re-education in Israel itself, though, as noted in the beginning of this article, the chances for a change from within are very slim. Pressure from the outside is called for because there is an urgent need to prevent the continued destruction of Palestine and the Palestinian people. However, that does not mean that one should give up the attempt to dismantle the ideological weapon by education and dissemination of alternative knowledge and understanding. The two are actually interlinked. Those very few and brave ones who toil relentlessly in Israel to re-educate their society from a pacifist, humanist and non Zionist perspective, are empowered by those who pressure the state to act along these lines and leave behind the old habits of aggression and militarism.
I would like to mention in this respect one particular group ‘New Profile’.
[vii] It is committed to introduce to and disseminate among younger Israelis the idea of pacifism. They are the ones who inform young recruits that even according to the Israeli law you are allowed to declare conscientious objection from serving in the IDF on pacifist grounds. They produce educational material to counter the militaristic educational system and take part in debating these issues. They became potentially so successful that the Israeli security service declared them a menace and a threat to national security. Their pure, simple message of the sanctity of life, the stupidity of war and militarism, is not yet connected to a more mature political deconstruction of the reality in Israel and Palestine, but it will be one day and could serve a potent transformative agent. Maybe because it is so pure it is so effective.
The Palestinians of course have an agency in this as well. Non-violence, rather than violence, has less immediate effect on alleviating an oppressive reality, but has long term dividends. But at this stage no one can interfere in the affairs of a liberation movement torn by different visions and haunted by years of defeat. What is important is to ask for a Palestinian contribution to a post-conflictual vision free of retribution and revenge. A non militarized vision for both Jews and Arabs, if transformed from the realm of utopia and hallucination into a concrete political plan, together with the outside pressure and the educational process from within, can help enormously in disarming ideologically the state of Israel.
Finally, the Jewish communities in the world, and in particular in the Western world, have a crucial role to play in this disarmament. Their moral and material support for Israel indicates endorsement of the ideology behind the state. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the last few years a voice of the non-Zionist Jews is increasingly heard under the slogan ‘not in my name’. The main weapon official Israel uses against the outside pressure, or any criticism for that matter, is that any such stance is anti-Semitic. The presence of Jewish voices in the call for peace and reconciliation accentuates the illogical way in which the state of Israel tries to justify the crimes against the Palestinians in the name of the crimes perpetrated in Europe against the Jews.
The project of disarming Israel is thus presented here as an ideological disarming. It begins with asking people concerned with the realities in Palestine and Israel, for whatever reason, to learn the history of the Zionist project, to understand its raison d’etre and its long term impact on the indigenous people of Palestine. Hopefully, such knowledge about the history would associate the violence raging in that land with the historical roots and the ideological background of Zionism as it developed through the years.
Recognition of the role of the ideology that necessitated the building of a fortress with one of the most formidable armies in the world, and one of the most flourishing arms industry, enables activists to tackle tangible goals in the struggle for peace and reconciliation in Israel and Palestine, and in the general struggle for disarmament in the world.
An efficient process of ideological disarming should avoid unnecessary demonization, should clearly distinguish between political systems and ‘people’ as such, should clearly perceive how reality is distorted, information manipulated, how educational systems and other socialization organs can indoctrinate and governments misrepresent and demonize whom they wish.
This is in essence a strategy of activism that would initiate a very tough dialogue with a state and a society that wish to be part of the ‘civilized’ world, while remaining racist and supremacist. In it lives a society that does not wish, or is unable, to see that its ideological nature and its policies locate it within the group of rouge states of this world. For better or for worse, what academics in the West teach about Israel, what journalists report about it, what conscious and conscientious people think about it and what eventually politicians would decide to do about it, is the key to change in the reality in Israel and Palestine. This dismal reality has repercussion not only to peace in the Middle East but in the world as a whole. But it is not a lost case, and now is the time to act.
[i] Uri Ben Eliezer, The Making of Israeli Militarism, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998.
[ii] Henry Rosenfeld and Shulamit Karmi, ‘The Emergence of Militaristic Nationalism in Israel’, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, 3:1 (Fall 1989), pp. 30-45.
[iii] See Ilan Pappe, Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1951, London: MacMillan, 1988.
[iv] See Ilan Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006.
[v] The wish to use as fierce military power as possible in order to regain the power of deterrence in admitted by the most senior military generals in the book Boomerang written by two senior Israeli journalists. See Raviv Druker and Offer Shelach, Boomerang, Tel-Aviv: Keter, 2005.
[vi] See Ilan Pappe, ‘The Post-Zionist Discourse in Israel’, Holy Land Studies, 1:1 (2002), pp. 3-20.